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How to Reverse the Italian Brain Drain: A master class from Australia 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article discusses the limits of Italian immigration policies and their effects on the Italian 
market of highly skilled individuals. Highly skilled individuals are normally perceived as valuable 
resources that a country should foster and even, if possible, attract from other states (Meyer and 
Brown, 1999). Unfortunately, Italian statutory provisions aimed at regulating immigration focus 
on limiting immigration without a reasoned distinction between skilled and unskilled immigrants.  
The paper reflects on the reasons for the parochial structure of the Italian white-collar market – 
which is mainly cultural - and its effects. In the past decades, Italy's private and public sectors 
have suffered the effects of a “brain drain” of a wide range of highly skilled professionals 
(Becker, Ichino and Peri, 2003). A series of reasons, such as the fact that Italy is - and has been 
for some time - one of the world's most sluggish, heavily industrialised economies (Hornby, 
Mackenzie, 2011), might explain the departure of skilled individuals from the Italian job market. 
Italy’s lack of economic growth in the private sector (and the related high unemployment rate) 
“pushes” away highly skilled individuals from areas of oversupply (e.g. Italy) to strong economies 
(e.g. Australia) where particular abilities are in demand.  
The paper would like to address the issue by suggesting the introduction of a medium/long-term 
visa for highly skilled individuals (Ottonelli and Torresi, 2010), and by promoting the 
establishment of private multinational universities modelled on the European Institute in 
Florence. These new institutions would open the academic job market to overseas researchers 
and at the same time provide a more solid base for the retrieval of Italian academics working 
abroad. The paper is divided in two sections which are preceded by an introduction. The first 
section deals with the Italian immigration statutory provisions. The second explains the policies 
that might increase the efficiency of the Italian market for elite employees.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The present economic crisis is endangering the future prosperity of the Italian economy. A 
decade of slow growth followed by a deep  economic financial crisis has had a negative impact 
on the Italian private sector. In comparison with the private sector, the Italian public sector has 
suffered indirectly from the country's lack of economic performance. High levels of tax evasion 
and two decades of slow economic development have yielded one of the largest sovereign debts 
in Europe. During the nineties, in an attempt to “balance the books” and to comply with the 
Treaty of Maastricht, the Italian government reduced employment in the public sector to a 
trickle and at the same time curtailed investments in research (De Vivo, Trigila, Panza, and 
Peccerillo, 2006). The reduction of job opportunities is, in part, exacerbated by an unofficial 
public sector employment praxis called “clientelism”, which favours the recruitment of a small 
pool of individuals (e.g. family,  business friends) that prioritise loyalty above meritocracy 
(Caciagli, 2006; 158). Caciagli's analysis suggests, for instance, that two decades of weak public 
sector demands have strengthened the incidence of clientelism. It is therefore not surprising that 
Italian researchers moved to countries with strong economic perspectives, such as Australia. 
It is also not unreasonable to speculate about the effects of a lack of “know-how” in areas such 
as policy making. The lack of understanding is particularly evident in new policy areas such as 
immigration and naturalisation. In the past 20 years, Italy has become a destination for mass low-
skilled immigration, yet Italian statutory provisions, such as the Testo Unico sull' Immigrazione 
(1998), have tried to reduce immigration by targeting specific crimes (e.g. the ones violent by 
nature) and by restricting naturalisation procedures (Aliziano, 2010, Breda and Calvanese, 1998; 
Calvanese 2011). However, the same procedures that target low-level skilled immigrants also 
affect highly qualified individuals, limiting the Italian opportunities for overseas highly skilled 
individuals (e.g. researchers and business managers).1 The restriction in the job market, in turn, 
contributes to the lack of competiveness in public sector jobs (already affected by the combined 
effects of the economic downturn and clientelism) and reduces the country's ability to advise and 
design policies that grapple with present problems. In short,  two decades of Italy's economic 
underperformance stimulates a vicious circle in which the brain drain progressively depletes the 
country's ability to retain highly qualified individuals who logically ought to be the prime actors 
in a future recovery. 
It is not all “doom and gloom”. Italian researchers who emigrated to strong economies such as 
Australia might eventually return to their homeland and bring back additional skills. Statistical 
studies suggest that developing countries might retrieve highly skilled individuals who matured 
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their abilities abroad (Meyer and Brown, 1999). Italy is not, by any means, an emerging economy, 
but some of Meyer's and Brown's assessments might help retrieving highly skilled Italians 
working abroad.  
However, I would argue that the retrieval of the Italian lost brains has to be part of a reform of 
the Italian white-collar job market that guarantees openness and meritocracy. Specifically, this 
paper discusses the potential benefits of adopting short and medium-term visa schemes for 
highly skilled individuals. The policy would combine:  an assessment of immigrant skills (perhaps 
similar to the evaluation chosen by the Australian Skilled Independent Visa) with  Torresi' and 
Ottonelli's idea of temporary work projects (2010). The temporary work projects are visa 
schemes designed around the needs (e.g. equality of work conditions and financial support in 
case the project fails) of a provisional worker. 
I would also argues that an increase in the quality and quantity of skilled individuals in the market 
might not dislodge the practice of clientelism in Italian research institutions. It is also improbable 
that a policy that seeks to squarely reform such a practice might have the effect of diminishing its 
pervasiveness. Studies of these types of networks of relations indicate that any reform might be 
ineffective (Caciagli 2006) or produce the opposite of the desired expectation (Bauman 2001). 
Italian clientelism  creates a stable system of relationships that react against any pressure to 
reform (Caciagli 2006).   
However, the low performance of the Italian academia compared to other first-world countries 
might produce a strong narrative for the development of a policy of multinational private 
institutions. For instance, according to the World Ranking of World Universities (2011), Italy is 
one of the few industrialised nations without a top 100 research institution. The multinational 
universities based on the model adopted by the European Institute in Florence would have the 
task to cover such a gap in research outputs, and  they would also be the ideal receptacles for : 
highly-skilled immigrants  and for Italian researchers working overseas.  
Before turning to the substantiation of my claims, a series of qualifications has to be inserted as a 
preliminary discussion. I will use the term clientelism as defined in Caciagli as “an informal 
network of power relations between individuals” (2006; 158). The practice of clientelism, which 
originated in rural societies, included an informal vertical power relation between the power 
holder (e.g. the patron/landowner) and a number of inferiors (e.g. seasonal workers). However, 
the new Italian clientelism is horizontal and might include a nationwide network of individuals 
that exchange tangible favours (e.g. jobs, public contracts, political votes) at national level (2006; 
Draft for the Editors   Friday, 13 January 2012 
International Migration  Dr Vito Breda  
4 | P a g e  
 
159). The problem of clientelism is sometimes associated with nepotism in terms of which 
members of a family receive undue benefits. Whilst there is strong evidence that the distribution 
of Italian academic positions is affected by nepotism (Allesina, 2011), the unfair allocation of 
vacancies to members of a family is only one of the aspects of clientelism. In Caciagli’s analysis, 
for instance, the possibility of exchanging tangible undue benefits includes a very large 
community (2006). It includes, for instance, individuals that are promoted in the ranking of the 
network for their political associations but who have no family ties with an academic patron.  
Furthermore, there are distinctive limitations in the Italian job market to highly skilled 
individuals, such as the requirement of fluency in Italian as a spoken language. My argument here 
is not that a knowledge of Italian is relevant to an immigrant's decision before emigrating but 
highly skilled activities (e.g. finance, engineering, and medical studies) might not require fluency. 
English has become the new elite's  lingua franca.  
The essay is divided into two sections. The first section discusses the immigration policy in Italy. 
It will argue that a combination of historical and sociological factors makes Italy uncompetitive 
in the global market of highly skilled individuals. The second part of the essay discusses the 
advantages of two short-medium term policies: first, a visa scheme based on Ottonelli's and 
Torresi's idea of temporary work projects (2010) and second  the establishment of multinational 
institutions.  
A CHOKING TIE FOR WHITE-COLLAR ASPIRATIONS IN ITALY 
Italian statutory provisions on immigration, residency, and citizenship are inadequate to develop 
a competitive internal job market that might attract Italian and foreign-skilled professionals 
working overseas (Di Bari, Zordella, 2008,). For instance, visa schemes adopted in other 
countries such as the Australia General Skilled Migration Program streamline applications and 
facilitate the process of obtaining permanent and/or temporary residency.  
There are distinctive historical reasons for the relative closure of the Italian immigration policy. 
Immigration is a relatively new phenomenon in Italy. It was only after the 1980s that Italy 
became a destination of mass immigration - mainly from North Africa and the former 
communist countries (Breda, and Calvanese, 1998). The regulatory framework that hosted the 
first waves of immigrants was set in articles 142 – 149 of the 1931 Testo Unico delle Leggi di 
Pubblica Sicurezza (hereafter TULPS). The articles were designed during the Fascist regime and 
set a series of strict limitations on travel, dwellings, and the employment of foreigners 
(Calvanese, 2011; 47).  
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Even a cursory reading of TULPS reveals the signs of the police regime that gave birth to it 
(Regio Decreto n.773, 1931). For instance, foreigners who already had a visa had three days from 
the moment of entering the country to request a local ‘resident permit’ from  the police 
constabulary (Regio Decreto n.773, 1931; 142). Landlords (or lease holders who might be 
relatives) hosting foreigners had only 48 hours to notify the local constabulary (Regio Decreto 
n.773, 1931; 147). Employers were also affected by the regulation. They were obliged to inform 
the police of the nationality of their workforce, and in case of dismissal, to inform the same 
constabulary of the “probable destination” of the non-Italian citizen (Regio Decreto n.773, 1931; 
146). Revoking the resident permit was the most common sanction for the violation of any of 
the above statutory dispositions (Regio Decreto n.773, 1931; 148). In brief, foreigners were 
“heavily monitored administrative licence holders” rather than rights bearers.  
Long before the 1990s reforms, the statutory provisions (and their sanctions) might have given 
rise to a question of constitutional compatibility. Yet, in practice, the norms regarding foreigners 
were widely ignored by all concerned. Administrative  inefficiency played a part in making 
TULPS ineffective. The administrative unit within the police constabulary charged with the task 
of authorising foreign residency, called Ufficio Stranieri, has similar functions as the Australian 
Borders Patrol but is often understaffed. It was common for foreigners to wait for months for 
resident permits, forcing them into areas of illegal residency and then illegal work.  
At pragmatic level admistrative inefficiency mediated a draconian regulatory system (Calvanese 
2011). During the 1990s, a series of reforms intended to change the plight of the foreigners in 
Italy from precarious administrative licence holders to “rights bearers” (Legge. 28, 1990, Legge 
n.286, 1998). In particular, the Legge n.286 “bundled” all the new statutory measures together in 
a codification called: Testo Unico delle Disposizioni Concernenti la Disciplina dell'immigrazione 
e Norme sulla Condizione dello Straniero (hereafter TU). First, the TU introduced a 
rationalisation of the work visas. Second, it established an electronic database of all foreigners 
that explicitly asked to work in Italy. Third, it streamlined the immigration procedures and 
integration (Legge n.286, 1998: 21-22). Fourth, the TU set out a specific category of highly 
skilled immigrants who were not affected by immigration   quotas. Other categories not limited 
by the T.U. immigration quota were professional athletes, nurses, and journalists. 
However, in the decade that followed the approval of the TU, there were few signs that Italy 
attracted more highly skilled professionals than the decade before (Fullin and Reyneri, 2010). As 
in other sociological tendencies, there are a series of reasons that might explain Italy’s lack of 
appeal as a destination for immigrants. Again the Italian economy was not growing as fast of 
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other industrialised economies (Hornby, Mackenzie, 2011). But it is also plausible to argue that 
TU regulations might have dampened the enthusiasm of those highly skilled immigrants who 
considered Italy a potential destination for relocation.  
First, some of the negative aspects of TULPS outlived the reforms. For instance, the TU 
maintained many of the restrictions of the resident permit system designed for all immigrants 
(Legge n.286, 1998: 5) and the measures that were aimed at creating a more appealing 
environment for immigrants by fostering integration and intercultural exchange remained 
unapplied (Legge n.40, 1998; 36).  
Second, in the public sector, senior research positions the TU opened to overseas applicants 
remain limited by official (e.g. a ministerial authorisation for chairs) and unofficial practices (e.g. 
clientelism) that tend to advantage internal candidates with a powerful patron within clientelism 
network. Even junior positions that can be acceded via a national competition require “trip to 
Italy” (probably with a tourist visa), sitting an exams, and in case of success, the winning 
candidate must return to the country of origin and request a work visa. As is the case with senior 
positions but to a lesser degree, the junior research vacancies are likely to be affected by the 
praxis of clientelism.  
Third, the TU provides a strict regulatory designation of who are highly skilled professionals. 
The definition includes only an elite group of individuals  who work for a multinational company 
with a branch in Italy and have a role within the same company as a company director. The 
rationale appears to be directed at facilitating the internal movement between multinational 
companies rather than an attempt to open the market of white-collar jobs.  
To illustrate the impact of such restriction, let me show the process of a highly qualified 
professional, let us call her Amy Cameron, would have to go through if she intended to relocate 
to Italy.  Amy holds a degree in marine biology from Australian National University, a master’s 
degree from Amsterdam University, and a Ph.D. in Environmental Studies from Cardiff 
University. She is also a senior manager at Environmental Impact Limited based in Cairns. She 
were looking for a position in either the private or public sectors. Unfortunately, Environmental 
Impact is not a company that has a branch in Italy nor does Ami have a director’s role in the 
company. The first task for Amy is to add her name (by post) to a database of overseas 
jobseekers accessible to Italian employers (Legge n.286, 1998: 32). Whilst the list is not ranked by 
the level of qualifications (it is based on the date of application), it might give skilled individuals 
the opportunity to be selected by an Italian firm. However, Caciagli's analysis of the impact of 
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clientelism suggests thatprivate employers might prefer to seek among friends, families, and the 
network of individuals that are part of their clientelism network before actively searching the list 
of overseas jobseekers (2006). This analysis is confirmed by  the statistical research of (Fullin and 
Rayneri, 2010).  In nutshell, Amy's chances to have her name cherry-picked from the list of 
overseas job seekers are very slim.  
Before 2011, an additional path to entry into the Italian job market for highly skilled immigrants 
was via an immigration quota (decided annually in collaboration with central and regional 
institutions). The immigration quota relied on a list of allocations divided by country of origin 
and employment sectors. It was not designed to attract qualified individuals. Both the countries 
selected for a specific quota (mainly third and second-world countries) and the sectors (e.g. 
agriculture and building) are traditional reservoirs of low-skilled temporary workers. At any rate, 
following the latest Italian financial crisis, the immigration provided by the quota has been 
suspended.  
“Bad timing”, Amy might think, but a casual stroll in front of Cairns City Hall gives her a new 
idea. Walking past the gate, she notices that Cairns City Council posted a local list of needed 
skilled professionals and tradespersons as part of the Australia Skilled Regional Sponsored Visa. 
Given the variegation of economic development in Italy, she thinks, similar initiatives might be 
carried out in different parts of Italy that are in need of specific skills and are less affected by the 
economic downturn. Amy is indeed right.  
In theory, she could browse the regional lists of required overseas employees (Legge n.286, 1998, 
21) in northern regions of Italy that have specific demands for marine biologists (e.g. Venice) 
and environmental impact, such as the Alpine regions. Unfortunately, the lists of required job 
vacancies (that were not filled by Italian or EU citizens)  have never been drawn up, and even if 
they have been, she most probably would have had to ask to have them posted to her address in 
Australia since the TU regulation does not include a requirement of publicity. The failed 
compliance is particularly unsettling in the rich and heavily industrialised North. For instance, the 
region around Venice has experienced two decades of substantial economic growth, but at the 
same time has, by way of comparison to other EU economies, supplied a low level of graduate 
workers (Direzione Sistema Statistico Regionale, 2010). It is again a matter of speculation, yet 
statistical analyses suggest that in Italy, a high level of education of overseas workers is not 
rewarded by a correspondent job allocation (Fullin and Reyneri, 2010). Specifically, Fullin and 
Reyneri argue that non-European citizens who might not be discriminated against in low skilled 
jobs are disproportionally unrepresented in managerial positions (2010).  
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As mentioned earlier, there is a plurality of factors that make highly skilled individuals 
particularly uninterested in the Italian job market. Chief among them is the fact that the country 
experienced ten years of slow economic performance, but even in local areas of robust economic 
growth, discriminatory practices and combined idiosyncrasies of official immigration policies put 
the Italian economy at a disadvantage. In particular, statutory policies that regulate immigration 
in Italy appear to hinder the development of an open market for highly skilled individuals. The 
argument here is not that the market for qualified individuals is not competitive. Rather than by 
putting highly qualified individuals such as our Amy through a series of administrative tasks, 
some of which are a dead end (e.g. the insertion on the list of overseas employees), the 
regulatory system discourages the immigration of talented individuals and all the human capital 
attached to it 
TEMPORARY WORK PROJECTS AND MULTINATIONAL UNIVERSITIES 
 
In this section I would like to suggest two immigration policies that might improve the 
competiveness of the Italian highly skilled job market. The first suggestion is to establish a new 
category of temporary work visas for white-collar overseas workers based on their specific needs. 
The new policy is drawn from Torresi's and Ottonelli's idea of temporary work projects (2010). 
Second, to reduce the effect of clientelism, I would suggest there might be the need to establish a 
series of private research institutions, perhaps modelled on the European Institute in Florence, 
in which the assessment of academic performance is done  by multinational referees.  
The space of the paper limits the amount of details that supports either proposals, yet the aim is 
to show the possibility, in theory and practice, of increasing the attractiveness, the so-called “pull 
factor”, of the Italian job market for highly skilled professionals. The two proposed policies are 
short and medium-term suggestions aimed at adjusting the unbalanced situation and, finally, at  
helping to re-start the country economy.  
 
a) The temporary work project visa for highly skilled professionals: a master class from Down Under  
Italian immigration policies, derived from an unfortunate past, and the TU might have allowed 
some of the aspects of the previous regime to outlive the 1990s reforms. In the regulation of 
immigration of highly skilled immigrants, for instance, there are strong indications that the TU 
aims at controlling the entry of skilled individuals rather than gathering an essential economic 
resource. However, I would like to suggest that a relatively small adjustment to the TU might 
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help talented individuals who work overseas. For instance, the introduction of temporary work 
projects to allow skilled individuals, like Amy, to work in Italy for a medium/long period of time.  
The idea of temporary work projects was recently suggested by Valeria Ottonelli and Tiziana 
Torresi. Ottonelli is based at Genoa University and Torresi at Adelaide University, but both 
researchers moved backwards and forwards between Europe, America, and Australia. They 
noted that a large group of immigrants decide to migrate on the basis of a life plan (2010). The 
life plan might include a destination, a type of job, a level of aspired integration, and a time to 
return to the country of origin. However, the state policies that seek to regulate those choices 
tend to mediate between ideological stances. On the one hand immigration policies defend 
liberal aspirations of market efficiency and, on the other hand, they manifest a concern about the 
perceived invasion of low-skilled immigrants. The tension between the two stances cannot be 
accommodated at a normative level (at their core the ideas of strictly ethnic nation-state and 
cosmopolitan open liberalism are antithetical), yet most countries have a tendency to set policies 
that, depending on the particular socio-economic circumstances, are on a point of the spectrum 
between the defence of the ethnic state and open borders. The TU favours an ethic centred 
policy  (Aliano, 2010). 
The Italian immigration policy  finds a normative justification in what Ottonelli and Torresi call 
the liberal inclusionist model. In the liberal inclusionist model aliens are allowed in a country 
with limited legal rights (to satisfy the concern of those who believe that a state should have a 
permanent national community), but immigrants undergo a process of integration that will 
quickly grant them the status of citizens. “Liberal inclusivists […] by coming fully to terms with 
the cosmopolitan spirit of egalitarian liberalism, accept its normative implications for the issue of 
membership. Their position consists of two arguments. First, the acceptance that the separation 
between states and the existence of citizenship rights are tied to a specific political community 
[…] However, and second, liberal democracies should be loyal to their cosmopolitan values and 
apply a liberal and inclusive policy to those who wish to move to their territory.” (Ottonelli and 
Torresi, 2010, 4).  
The liberal inclusionist is, to put it simply, a pragmatic response to what is perceived as a 
temporary situation. In an ideal – liberal - world, where democracy has spread in all countries 
and the free market has fostered a worldwide level of economic prosperity, there are fewer 
compelling reasons for immigrating and the reduction in the number of relocating individuals 
will proportionally reduce the concerns of nationalists (for an analysis of the legal implications of  
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an  ideal cosmopolitan society, see, for  instance: Held, 1995). But Ottonelli and Torresi are 
unconvinced by the liberal inclusionist model.  
Individuals might continue, they argue, to migrate, even if those ideal conditions envisaged by 
liberal inclusionists were realised, because individuals often want to experience life in a different 
setting. The argument developed by Ottonelli and Torresi is not that immigration might not be 
reduced by the spread of democracy and economic prosperity. Rather they suggest that the 
liberal inclusionist model does not consider the full implications of the freedom to pursue 
individual aspirations (e.g. happiness, a good life, etc.) that are pivotal factors of individual 
decisions  (2010; 5).  
The policy, proposed by Ottonelli and Torresi, to cater for these life choices is, I think, 
enlightening and it might be appealing for  a new Italian immigration regulation.  Ottonelli and 
Torresi suggest that the state should devise a policy that caters specifically for those individuals 
who perceive immigration as a matter of choice. The choice to emigrate is, for these individuals, 
a temporary step that might enhance their CV, economic wealth, as well as cultural enrichment. 
However, most of these individuals will return to their homeland (Ottonelli and Torresi, 2010). 
Once in their homeland, temporary immigrants might contribute to their personal careers and 
the development of their own national economy (Meyer and Brown, 1999).  
The return home is the distinctive aspect of temporary immigration. From a series of 
quantitative and qualitative analyses, Ottonelli and Torresi show that temporary immigrants have 
a tendency to work more hours than citizens (or permanent immigrants), postpone the disposal 
of earnings (sometimes for the development of a different life project), and normally do not 
engage in political activity that is perceived as threatening to the stability of a national community 
(2010, 9).  Whist  these factors should  make the establishment of temporary  working visa for 
highly qualified individuals  very appealing to all industrialised  countries,    they   should be 
particularly appealing to  economies like the Italian  that might need a short time burst of 
resources to overcome the worst aspect of the present economic crisis.     
It should be noted that the idea of temporary work visas might stimulate a series of objections. 
For instance employers might exploit the status of temporary immigrants. In the case of highly 
qualified individuals, I would argue that the concern is more theoretical than practical. In Italy, 
immigrant workers have the same level of safeguard as citizens. It is also  reasonable to expect 
that highly skilled individual, by a way of comparison with low skilled workers who might have 
problem with language and might be intimidate by an alien administration  should have the 
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ability to retrieve information and demand the  protection of their working  rights. For instance, 
a highly qualified individual such as Amy might not be concerned about the temporary nature of 
her status if she knows that her general work conditions would be as protected as those of any 
other Italian employee.  
Let me recall that, an immigration policy cannot be designed to create substantial equality. For 
instance, a company might not pay Amy the same wage as a temporary visa holder since s/he 
might not produce the same long-term rewards to the company  as an Italian citizen. However, 
the argument works only to a degree. The acceptance of the less favourable condition is, for 
instance, Amy's personal life choice which is counterbalanced by the experience she is gaining by 
working abroad.  
A series of safeguards might also mitigate the potential side effects of temporary work project 
visas. For instance, the temporary visa might not be linked to working for the entire period of 
residency and might include financial insurance that deals with the cost of repatriation. The 
financial guarantee to return home was suggested by Ottonelli's and Torresi's articles to protect 
low-skilled workers (2010, 19). We know that low-skilled workers might find themselves pushed 
into 'illegal inhumane work conditions' (Calvanese, 2011). Nevertheless I would argue that a 
financial safeguard for the cost of repatriation might also make a policy aimed at attracting 
temporary highly-skilled workers distinctively more appealing. It might, for instance, add 
considerable interest  to a scheme for young professionals who might be highly qualified but 
have not got large savings.  
Some of the minute aspects of Ottonelli's and Torresi's proposal are discussed at length in their 
article and could not all be reproduced here. However, some pragmatic points  are worth noting. 
For instance, the temporary immigration projects policy will require a system that evaluates 
qualifications, job experience, and age. The institutional problems of the Ufficio Stranieri (e.g. a 
culture of administrative control) might be mitigated by the allocation of clerical work to private 
firms. The system is used already by emerging economies that seek to attract highly skilled 
individuals and want to facilitate the visa procedures but do not have the administrative capacity 
for delivering an expedite service .   
b) New Multinational Universities  
The second policy I would like to suggest aims at promoting the establishment of new private 
multinational universities modelled on the European Institute in Florence. The policy of 
favouring the formation of new multinational universities has a twofold objective. On the one 
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hand, it aims at retrieving researchers working overseas (e.g. Australia and the US)  by enlarging 
the receptive capacity of Italian universities without impinging on precarious public finances. On 
the other hand, it aspires to evade the effect of clientelism.  Multinational University should  
attract highly skilled individuals working abroad on merit that is potential benefits they might 
bring to the research institution (rather than a patron). In addition it is also reasonable to 
speculate that enlarging  capacity  of Italian Academia might attract Italians currently working 
abroad who normally work in a multinational environment. 
Italian public universities are particularly affected by depleted economic resources, the lack of a 
culture of meritocracy and the problem of clientelism. All three of these problems might require 
a long-term solution but a distinction might be drawn between stricto senso economic problems 
and those that are cultural. Even before the economic downturn, Italian academia had to manage 
a challenging financial situation (De Vivo, Trigila, Panza, and Peccerillo, 2006; Ruggio, 2008; 13 
Rossi, 2008, 29) that will not be discussed in this paper. I would like to reflect instead on the 
feasibility of “low cost” (for Italian public finances) immigration policies that might help 
reducing the pragmatic effect of clientelism.  
Caciagli argues that modern Italian clientelism is formed by a network of individuals with an 
internal political affiliation, rites, values, and symbols, who exchange tangible benefits (e.g. jobs, 
research funds). Whilst it originated in an agricultural society, clientelism has a distinctive appeal 
in a globalised society (2006). For instance, the network of clienteles provides security - by 
informally bypassing strict meritocratic tests - and economic benefits by unfairly allocating 
resources to its members (2006). This is not a distinctive Italian problem. Bauman, for instance, 
referred to the metaphor of the “fortress under siege” to describe a cultural community he 
perceived as a side product of globalisation. “ ‘Culture’ [for the members of a clientelism 
network] is synonymous with a besieged fortress, and in a fortress under siege, the inhabitants 
are required to manifest unswerving loyalty daily and to abstain from any hobnobbing with 
outsiders” (Bauman, 2001; 101). Bauman's description of a culture of informal partnerships is 
very general sociological deduction,  but  The important point I would like to drwo here form 
both Caciagli and Bauman is that Italian clientelism (with its deeply embedded relations with 
political sphere)  is unlikely to be altered in an economic crisis exactly because it is providing 
security to those who are part of the network designed to resist  social and economic uncertainty.  
So, the resilience of clientelism might justify a solution that does not directly change the stability 
of the Italian academia. Developing this point, I would like to argue that by favouring the 
creation of new multinational universities, it might be possible to enlarge the academic job 
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market, and in turn, increase Italy's appeal as a destination for overseas researchers. To start 
with, in Italy there already is  a well-established multinational university — the European 
Institute in Florence. There are also several foreign university branches that might not be subject 
to the effects of Italian clientelism. For instance, Monash University has a branch in Tuscany, 
and New York University has a branch in Rome.  These institutions might provide the 
springboard for a more general policy. In particular I would suggest  that  by increasing the 
financial benefits  (by reducing tax and providing long-term free leases to land and building used 
by these institutions) Italy will  attract  more elite academics (at any stage of their career) to Italy.   
The most obvious evidence of the potential benefits of the proposed policy is drawn from the 
successful history of the European Institute in Florence. The European Institute started 
operating in 1976 and was the result of an inter-governmental agreement between, at the time, 
European Community Member States. Its aim was to promote studies that might help European 
integration but European Institute research portfolio went beyond the original mandate 
(Convention setting up a European University Institute, 1972, Art 2), transforming it into a 
formidable research institution in areas such as social, legal and economic studies.  
In contrast to Italian institutions, the European Institute favours multi-nationalism. It was indeed 
one of the key criteria that allowed the 1970s’ Europe Community Members to agree on its 
creation. For instance, the 1976 convention guaranteed the multinational management structure 
of the Institute by imposing a national quota of its directors and, at the same time, the rigour of 
its financial administration. For instance, the finances of the European Institute are verified by 
an external team of multinational auditors. Finally, the Italian Republic committed itself to 
providing for the cost of the infrastructure (mainly buildings and land).  
I would like to argue that the imposition of multinational management, an external multinational 
audit, and the long-term free leases of the facilities should become part of a general policy aimed 
at improving the competiveness of Italian-based private universities. These new institutions, it is 
reasonable to argue, will be, by design, attractive to highly skilled individuals who are seeking job 
opportunities in Italy. Furthermore, multinational institutions will also attract lost brains. That 
are  talented Italians working in overseas institutions by giving them the possibility of long-term 
career opportunities.  
For several years, the Minister of Education tried a policy aimed at recovering lost brains. They  
were for the great majority individuals, at the medium stages of their careers,  who might have 
been penalised by not having a powerful enough “patron” within the clientelism network. The 
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scheme had limited success (Rientro dei Cervelli, 2008). After five years, only a small number (in 
2008, 40 of the 500 Italian researchers that had relocated to an Italian institution) were offered a 
permanent position. The very low retention rate (and waste of resources attached  to it) appears 
to be related to difficulties with the management of human resources and financial restrictions 
(Rossi, 2008), but there is also a strong indication that the low retention rate might have to do 
with clientelism. That is, Italian researchers with  different degree of overseas  experience,    find 
themselves competing for a limited number of senior positions against individual who have over 
the years in Italy matured a series of strong connections within the network.  
Is it a rather unnecessary fuss? The idea of setting a policy of private multinational universities to 
reduce the impact of clientelism might appear excessive. Exceptionally gifted individuals might 
be helped, not hindered, by the informality of the clientelism network. For instance, patrons 
might actively look for highly skilled individuals (Italian or foreigners) to attract economic 
projects from overseas (e.g. the EU). The informal flexibility of clientalism might, for instance,  
actively scout for Italian researchers  with a track record of sourcing revenues.    My concern is 
that the positive aspects of clientelism cannot be left to the “goodwill” of a group of patrons 
who might little interest on developing an Italian world class research. Rather, a systemic re-
balance of the academic market (that fosters openness, efficiency and meritocracy) is, I would 
argue, a necessary step in improving the country's ability to retrieve Italian talents and, in turn, 
helping its present  economic down-spiral.    
CONCLUSION 
Creating the institutional conditions for attracting the expertise of highly skilled individuals from 
places like Australia  might, among other factors,  help Italy recover from the present crisis and 
develop a condition of economic flourishing. In the first section of this paper I discussed Italian 
immigration policies. I argued that they might have derived from an unfortunate past (a 1930 
police regime) and the 1990 reforms might have inherited an “institutional culture” of 
administrative control. There are also strong indications that public sector deficiencies combined 
with private dysfunctional recruitment procedures (e.g. clientelism in Caciagli and discrimination 
in Fullin Rayneri) might be to blame for a series of unjustifiable bottle necks in the job market of 
highly skilled professionals. 
However, independently from the possible reasons for the present situation, a series of small 
policy changes with relatively little cost for public finance might increase Italy's appeal as a 
destination for highly qualified individuals. In the second section of the paper, I argued, for 
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instance,  that a policy drawn from Torresi's and Ottonelli's ideas of temporary work project 
visas might increase Italy’s appeal in the market of highly qualified individuals. Ottonelli and 
Torresi are senior researchers who have worked both in Italy and abroad. Their proposal shows 
an in-depth personal understanding of the special requirements of relocating white-collar 
workers and an awareness of the policies adopted in Australia (e.g. the Australian Skilled 
Independent Visa) to streamline relocation procedures. In contrast, for instance, to the Italian 
present regulation, the temporary work projects for the highly skilled promote rights (e.g. 
equality in work conditions and career progression for aliens) and services (e.g. a financial safety 
net in case the migration project fails) for overseas white-collar immigrants.  
 The temporary work project visas might also help reduce the endemic problems of the Italian 
academia. In particular the area of academic research (which is mostly  publicly founded) is, and 
has been for a long time, one elective area of clientelism. Italian clientelism tends to create a 
network of individuals in which patrons exchange tangible favours and develop a culture based 
on loyalty above meritocracy. Clientelism, as a reaction to limited resources, cannot be 
exclusively cured by an officially open market (brought by temporary work projects) since 
clientelism relies on the informal exclusion of outsiders.  
So to grapple with clientalism, I suggested a policy that should help setting new private   
universities and expanding the branches of those  already in Italy. The suggestion is based on the 
success story of the Europe Institute in Florence. The institute, for over three decades, has 
functioned as multinational administrated high education establishment  that seeks to attract 
qualified individuals and promote world-class research. The guarantee of multi-nationality of its 
administration (both in managerial and financial terms) allowed the institution to prosper in a 
way that might be replicated in new private institutions. The new multinational universities 
would expand the capacity of the Italian higher education sector market for highly qualified 
individuals and should, also,   stimulate the return ofthe lost brains who, at present, are working 
in overseas institutions, by proving to provide long-term career opportunities not offered by the 
public sector.  
NOTE 
1. The explanation for the present Italian legal response to a global phenomenon is indeed 
multifaceted. For instance, in the past two decades, Italy was governed by a coalition that 
included nationalist and regionalist political parties with open xenophobic agendas, yet there 
are strong indications that there is more than simple irrational parochialism in the Italian 
development of immigration policies. 
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